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NATO IN LIBYA: IMPLICATIONS ON THE FUTURE OF THE ALLIANCE
I've worried openly about NATO turning into a two-tiered alliance: Between members who specialize in "soft' humanitarian, development, peacekeeping, and talking tasks, and those conducting the "hard" combat missions. Between those willing and able to pay the price and bear the burdens of alliance commitments, and those who enjoy the benefits of NATO membership -be they security guarantees or headquarters billets -but don't want to share the risks and the costs. This is no longer a hypothetical worry. We are there today. And it is unacceptable.
-Robert Gates 1 NATO operations in Libya in 2011 exposed significant weaknesses in the alliance and highlighted a need to reevaluate NATO's future. Widely heralded as a success, NATO's eight month operation against the Qaddafi regime taxed NATO member nations' political will, financial resources and collective capabilities. U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, in a speech in Brussels shortly before he turned the job over to Secretary Leon Panetta, highlighted a considerable disparity in the ability and willingness of member nations to contribute, financially and operationally, to actions supporting interests considered by many NATO nations, as vital.
During U.S.-led Operation Odyssey Dawn in March, and later, Operation Unified Protector, as the NATO mission became known, daily NATO strikes continued through the summer with little discernable progress on the ground. As the weeks and months dragged on, schisms began to appear between participating NATO nations. Daily NATO kinetic missions often resulted in civilian collateral damage, eroding political support in many European nations and in the United States. As a result, in June, Norway pulled some supporting aircraft out of the operation, and Italian foreign minister, Franco Frattini, unilaterally called for a pause in the bombing to reevaluate the mission.
Additionally, initial operational planning exposed glaring capability gaps. It was quickly apparent that without American air-to-air refueling, intelligence reconnaissance and surveillance, electronic warfare and strategic lift assets, sustained air operations over Libya were impossible. In this environment of economic instability, diminishing resources and shrinking defense budgets in the NATO zone, the 2010 Lisbon Summit Initiatives called for significant capability enhancements and expanding NATO's role to include peace support, nation building and reconstruction. NATO's structures, attitudes and institutions, forged over 40 years of the Cold War have not evolved sufficiently since 1991 to efficiently and effectively operate in today's dynamic security environment composed of small scale hybrid conflicts in austere environments, non-state actors and asymmetric warfare. NATO operations in Libya through the summer of 2011 exposed this failure to adjust, calling into question NATO's utility and suitability in future conflicts. NATO is enforcing an historic United Nations mandate to protect the people of Libya, and we will keep up the pressure until we meet our objectives: an end to all attacks against civilians, the withdrawal of all regime and paramilitary forces to bases, and full and unhindered humanitarian access to people in need across Libya.
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Controversial as an arms embargo and non-partisan no-fly zone enforcement mission to protect civilians, the perception developed that NATO was taking sides in an offensive operation to support the insurgents and destroy regime forces in the field.
The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 authorised the protection of civilians, but specifically ruled out the use of ground forces. The alliance stretched its mandate to the limit, in effect becoming the insurgents' air arm. Most damaging and emblematic of a long-term divergence of interests in NATO was Germany's opposition to the mission in Libya.
…Germany marked a new low when it followed its refusal to back Resolution 1973 with a withdrawal of all practical support for NATO's mission, even jeopardising the early stages of the campaign by pulling its crews out of the alliance's airborne warning and control aircraft. The lack of unity between Germany and other NATO member nations can be explained by Germany's growing economic relationship with Russia. Western Europe's reliance on Russian oil and natural gas is especially evident in Germany. Germany imports almost forty percent of its gas and twenty percent of its oil from Russia.
Russia's emergence as a more assertive and confident economic and political actor has coincided with another important regional trend: the intensification of economic and political ties between Germany and Russia, particularly in the energy field.
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Diplomatic feuding between Moscow and Kiev, and political instability and corruption within Ukraine led to threats of Russian gas supply disruptions through the Germany has strong economic and political interests in maintaining stable relations with Russia. Thus, Berlin is going to react cautiously to proposals that could lead to deterioration of relations with Moscow. This will make the pursuit of coherent transatlantic policy toward Russia much more difficult in the future.
The nature of the Germany-Russia relationship affects more than future transatlantic policy directly aimed at Russia. The close economic ties between the two countries make it unlikely that, in the future, Germany will support any potential NATO policies or actions contrary to the interests of the Russian government.
Another source of friction within the NATO alliance during Operation Unified
Protector was a lack of political support for offensive strikes, even among the few nations actually flying those missions. With only eight nations providing crews and aircraft to enforce the arms embargo, no-fly zone and R2P missions, there was little tolerance for the loss of use of any of those assets, even for a short period of time. Yet, due to political sensitivities, numerous participating nations periodically denied requests for their aircraft throughout the operation.
In May, Norway threatened to recall its F-16 aircraft deployed to fly in Libya.
While in support of the desire to protect civilians from attack by regime forces, several
Northern European nations questioned the morality of bombing in an environment where it was difficult to distinguish combatants from non-combatants. Many NATO member governments were also uneasy with the now obvious military and political objective of removing Gaddafi from power, in other words regime change. This struck many as hypocrisy, as many of these governments criticized the U.S. Both rebel and regime forces were able to monitor the ATC system and were therefore forewarned about coalition aircraft flying into Libyan airspace. Also, the aircraft call signs used during transit identified national origin and aircraft type.
On numerous occasions NATO strikes reportedly resulted in civilian casualties.
Information available to regime forces and the international press from ATC data The Italian foreign minister, Franco Frattini, had suggested that NATO's credibility was at risk after a number of civilian casualties in air raids, but his comments were given short shrift in London and Paris, where both governments instead urged an intensification of pressure on Muammar Gaddafi… develop the capability to defend our populations and territories against ballistic missile attack as a core element of our collective defence, which contributes to the indivisible security of the Alliance. We will actively seek cooperation on missile defence with Russia and other Euro-Atlantic partners. Adapt NATO's force structure and planning processes to emphasise noncombat missions, such as humanitarian relief, maritime security, infrastructure protection and support for multinational responses to natural disasters. 27 With defense budgets for individual member nations and NATO as a whole shrinking for the foreseeable future, it is highly unlikely that these desired capability enhancements can be achieved. Additionally, The United Nations and numerous NGOs vital or important national interests.
Recommendations
As a result of weaknesses exposed by operations in Libya, NATO needs to make some hard choices in order to ensure their relevance and viability as a capable security and defense alliance in the future. Participating nations should base their decisions on the fiscal realities and political climate that currently exist and are likely to persist into the foreseeable future. Looking forward, the structure of NATO needs to address the issues of unequal financial commitment, varying political will and gaps in critical capabilities for European members.
A model for pooling resources and ensuring the availability of multi-lateral full spectrum capability is the integrated multi-national NATO E-3A AWACS program.
These NATO AWACS aircraft are financed across the alliance's membership and are flown and maintained by multi-national crews. For other combat functions, the current NATO strategy of national combat capability specialization, where a NATO nation gives up full spectrum capability, instead focusing on a specific support mission, leaves the alliance vulnerable to a member withholding a critical capability due to divergent interests or political differences with other member nations.
The integrated multi-national approach used in the E-3A program, applied to other critical capabilities, may help ensure that NATO possesses an affordable sustained power projection capability into the future. A similar NATO owned and multinationally crewed approach can be applied to ISR platforms (E- Applying the multi-national model to the funding and operation of these mission areas would help to ensure availability of full spectrum air capability when needed.
These NATO owned assets would likely reduce overall expense due to shared costs and usage reducing total aircraft required. NATO ownership would also ensure a more equitable financial commitment across member nations. This shared capability concept would also allow national governments to withhold support due to political concerns without the loss of an asset or capability to NATO.
The NATO AWACS approach can be similarly applied to maritime capabilities 
Conclusion
NATO operations in Libya, though considered a success by many, highlighted significant weaknesses in the alliance's ability to execute even a small air campaign against a technically inferior adversary. Operation Unified Protector also exposed a disparity in the ability and willingness of NATO members to contribute, a divergence in interests for member nations and a growing capabilities gap. Additionally, in today's challenging fiscal environment, NATO's ability to address these weaknesses and implement the fixes are significantly reduced.
NATO's decision to get involved in an internal conflict, lack of clear objectives and requirement for significant logistics and mission support left the alliance poorly situated to achieve a positive mission outcome. NATO's subsequent pursuit of regime change as a required endstate threatened to break up the already fragile coalition. The alliances material and capabilities shortfalls call into question NATO's viability in any future conflict. The need to address the shortfalls while concurrently seeking a greater role in post conflict reconstruction, HA/DR and stability operations are unrealistic in a constrained fiscal environment.
It is clear that NATO has considerable hurdles to achieving full spectrum military viability in the future. By concentrating on the strengths of the alliance and combining resources to fill capability and asset gaps, these hurdles are not insurmountable. In spite of their problems, the NATO alliance is the only military alliance in the world that is able to act in such a wide range of circumstances, and with the assistance of the United
States, more equitable participation and more efficient organization of their core competencies in Europe NATO should be capable of meeting nearly any foreseeable military challenge for many years to come.
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